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When Did Lawyers for Children
Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth
Century on Best Interests and the
Role of the Child Advocate
JANE SPINAK*

Lawyers for children are faced with a difficult dilemma each time they
meet a new client. Unlike lawyers for adults, who begin most initial meetings with their clients figuring out the kind of legal problem that the client
presents, lawyers for children begin with trying to determine what professional relationship the lawyer and client will have. The answer—which
may even vary over the course of the representation—requires the lawyer
to consider a multitude of factors, including how many of these factors are
for the lawyer to determine on her own and how many are for the client to
determine. The factors can be organized into four categories: the type of
legal situation the client faces, the state law governing representation for
children, the professional codes and standards in effect, and the nature of
the client. Diffused through these categories is the complexity of societal
values about family life, individual and familial liberty and autonomy, and
governmental power and responsibility. Overlaying this complexity is a
concept that has now gained international status: the best interest of the
child (BIOC). A recent symposium, The Child and the Nation-State:
France, Sweden, and the US, 1900-2000, asked participants to consider
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. My thanks to
Lisa Tiersten and Lars Tragardh for inviting me to participate in the symposium discussed in
this article and for providing me with insightful comments on an earlier draft, and to Courtney
Howard for excellent research assistance.
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children’s rights and the nation state during the twentieth century, providing an opportunity to reconsider how the concept of BIOC has been incorporated into American child advocacy and deeply affected the way in
which lawyers for children think about representing children’s rights.1
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw an explosion of child advocacy and, during the same period, a significant investigation into the
meaning of BIOC in the United States. Lawyers for children were challenged to reconcile the meaning of children’s rights with the concept of
BIOC: was the child an autonomous decision maker able to direct his or
her representation or was the child in need of a representative who would
“discover” and then advocate for what was best for the child? After almost
forty years of lawyering for children in the United States, this question
remains unresolved. To help explain why reaching a resolution has been
so difficult, I would like to employ a central set of texts about BIOC: the
trilogy written by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit
between 1973 and 1986 and republished in one volume as The Best
Interests of the Child in 1996.2 These texts had an enormous impact on
child welfare policy in the United States, Canada, England and in translation, far beyond. Yet, their influence on resolving the nature of the role of
lawyers for children is surprisingly limited. I hope in reexamining these
key texts, written during the gestational period of lawyering for children,
to unearth some useful lessons for twenty-first century children’s lawyers
still struggling to define their responsibilities to their young clients.
Nearly forty years have passed since the United States Supreme Court
determined that children at risk of losing their liberty in delinquency proceedings had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court’s decision
highlights the parallels between adult and child criminal proceedings, and
recognizes the limitations of a parens patriae role for a court when the
consequences for a child include a significant period of time in state custody.3 While the Supreme Court has never held that children subject to
state intervention as victims of child maltreatment are similarly entitled to
counsel, only seven years after the Gault decision, in 1974, the federal
government began requiring states to provide children with some form of
1. The Conference was held at Columbia University in New York City on May 26–28,
2006. Participants included academics and policymakers from Sweden, France and the United
States, along with representatives of UNICEF and Save the Children, Sweden. An earlier version of this paper was presented by the author.
2. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973), BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979), and IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (with Sonja Goldstein, 1986). The compendium volume, THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, will be cited as GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. in the footnotes.
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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representation of their interests in child protective proceedings as one of
the conditions of drawing down federal foster care funding.4 The type of
representation in those proceedings continues to vary tremendously from
state to state but includes attorneys, guardians ad litem (GAL), volunteer
advocates, and hybrid models of these alternatives.5 Some states, such as
New York, had established a system of representation by lawyers for children in delinquency and child protective proceedings prior to Gault; others quickly established systems to ensure compliance with federal mandates. Within a very short period of time, children were receiving some
form of representation throughout the country. At a much slower pace
states also began to permit, and in a few states require, lawyers for children in private custody matters, especially in highly contested divorce
proceedings. When attorneys—rather than other adult advocates—were
authorized to represent children, they began to examine the scope and
meaning of representing a person who was considered an “infant” under
the law, subject to the care and custody of an adult, usually a parent, and
often with less than full capacity to direct the lawyer’s representation
because of age, cognitive, intellectual or emotional development, or other
disability.
Some states supplied a specific definition of the lawyer’s role by
statute; other states enacted more general language that was subsequently
interpreted through case law. Lawyers sought direction in professional
ethics codes, newly developing standards of practice for child advocates,
and the evolving legal definitions that courts provided.6 They came face
to face repeatedly with the concept of “best interests of the child,” either
within the definition of their role or as part of the ultimate decision that
the court was being asked to make.7 Given that the divorce rate in the
United States was still reaching its peak, and the numbers of children subject to reports of neglect and abuse had skyrocketed after the passage of
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974 (CAPTA), it is not
4. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247; 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106 (West 2000)(CAPTA). CAPTA provides federal funding to states in support of prevention, assessment, investigation, prosecution, and treatment activities and also provides grants to
public agencies and nonprofit organizations for demonstration programs and projects. CAPTA
established, among other child protective policies, requirements for each state to establish a
child maltreatment reporting system.
5. Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q.
421, 424 (2000).
6. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
(1973); Federle, supra note 5, at 426.
7. “Regardless of who acts as the child’s representative, most states require that that representative (including, in some instances, the child’s attorney) act in the child’s best interests.”
Federle, supra note 5, at 427.
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surprising that professionals involved in decisions concerning intervention in the family—social workers, mental health professionals, lawyers
and judges—were struggling to understand the standards for making decisions about children and the role that these professionals should play in
that decision making.8
Before turning to the Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (Goldstein et al.) trilogy, I would like to distinguish what kind of BIOC these professionals are
facing.9 Many of the participants in The Child and the Nation-State symposium addressed BIOC by considering how sweeping social welfare,
education and child-care policies affected issues of individual autonomy,
family structure, and national demographics. When we discussed these
issues, we were not speaking of BIOC as a legal definition but as a social
aspiration captured most effectively in the culminating event of the socalled “Century of the Child”: adoption of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) by virtually the entire global community at the end of
the twentieth century.10 This compendium of positive and protective
rights for children worldwide represents a remarkable recognition by
nation states individually, and as part of the international community, of
the centrality of the child in all aspects of life. Moreover, Article 3 of the
CRC explicitly creates a core decision-making principle for any public or
private body affecting children:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

Even with the qualification of best interests being “a primary consideration” rather than “the primary consideration,” the essence of considering
what is best for the child is not dislodged.11 The Convention specifically
recognizes that the family should be protected as the fundamental and nat8. The divorce rate peaked in the late 1970s. See The First Measured Century at
http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/4family6.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). From 1974–80 child
neglect and abuse reports rose from 60,000 to 1.1 million per year. See DOUGLAS ABRAMS &
SARAH RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, at 288 (2003).
9. I would like to thank Johanna Schiratzki for highlighting the need for this distinction to
me in her commentary on this paper at the symposium.
10. The United States and Somalia, which lacks a recognized government, are the exceptions. See, Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the
United States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations and Areas
for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 966 (2006).
11. Philip Alston, The Bests Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and
Human Rights, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, 11–13 (Philip Alston ed., 1994). Alston points out that during the CRC drafting
process, BIOC was a familiar enough term for the drafters who appeared to pay little attention
to the domestic wars over the concept.
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ural environment in which children flourish and that separation of children
from their parents against their will should only occur when it is in the
child’s best interests.12 While the definition of the concept may remain
contested—and subject to cultural and societal norms and beliefs—it is
fair to say that the global community has enshrined the idea that decisionmakers must consider whether a policy is best for children even in the
context of intervening in family life.13 By contrast, how BIOC is interpreted in the framework of a legal proceeding is more limited by statutory definition, precedent, and court interpretation (though equally fraught
with personal and societal beliefs). This legal concept of BIOC is the one
Goldstein et al. sought to define for professionals making determinations
in custody and child welfare proceedings about where a child should live.
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973), the first volume of the
Goldstein et al. trilogy, proposed specific legal and psychological guidelines to give meaning, in particular, to the overarching concept of best
interests of the child when the child’s placement is at issue.14 The guidelines were remarkably simple: once the state has intervened in the autonomy of the family unit, the child’s needs become paramount and decisionmaking must be shaped by the child’s sense of time and need for continuity in relationships. The authors warned decision makers in child protection proceedings that they lacked the ability to make long-term predictions on what is best for the child and, to the contrary, were really only
determining the least detrimental alternative for the child. What was best
from their perspective—a stable family free from state intervention—had
already been lost.15 Goldstein et al. recommended that the legislature set
a time limit for determining whether a child remained with a new caretaker or returned to the original caretaker (usually the biological parent)
to highlight their psychological theory of continuity and stability of relationships and to give judges a rule to follow in determining what is best—
or least bad—for a child separated from her initial caretaker.16 In private
12. CRC Preamble and Article 9.
13. Of course, there are numerous examples of how nations have failed children, despite our
international declarations, during the “Century of the Child.” See, e.g., Michael Freeman, The
End of the Century of the Child? 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS (2000).
14. For GOLDSTEIN ET AL., placement of a child is disputed when the state has intervened to
remove a child from parents or when parents cannot agree on custody and the court is asked to
resolve the custody dispute and determine where the child should live.
15. See discussion starting at page 399 of BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD,
GOLDSTEIN ET AL.’s second book, for a fuller description of their understanding of family autonomy.
16. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2 at 20–21; While framed in more affirmative and general terms, the CRC Preamble would soon similarly note, “[the] child, for the full and harmonious
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmos-
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custody matters, Goldstein et al. recommended that once a custodian had
been chosen, continuity and stability would only be achieved by restricting any change in custody and giving the custodian full decision-making
authority over the child, including whether the child would visit the noncustodial parent.17 While some of their specific recommendations—especially concerning the power of the custodial parent—were highly controversial, the centrality of continuity and stability for children and the need
for content in custodial decisions struck a responsive chord for professionals hungry to give definition to a concept that relied so heavily on personal values and case-by-case decision making. A conversation of sorts
began in response to Beyond’s proposals that sought to give further definition to BIOC.
Robert Mnookin’s Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy can be seen as a representative example of how
this conversation proceeded. Mnookin shares Goldstein et al.’s fundamental concerns about the indeterminacy of BIOC as a legal standard in
child placement decisions and, like them, proposes a more determinate
approach.18 Mnookin utilizes three assumptions to make the standard
more determinate. The first two—deference to family autonomy and continuity and stability in children’s relationships—he shares with Goldstein
et al. The third, that a legal standard must not contradict deeply held and
widely shared social values, he finds missing from the Goldstein et al.
analysis.19 Mnookin warns that the Goldstein et al. creation of a singular
set of psychologically based guidelines for all types of child placement
proceedings fails to distinguish between private ordering inherent in most
custody proceedings between parents or other caretakers and the presence
of enormous state power in child protective proceedings. In the United
States, state paternalism has traditionally been limited not only by a strong
preference for family autonomy but also by a political consensus that
“government may act coercively only when good cause is shown.”20
Mnookin identifies two points in time that are essential for child-protection decision making: at the point of intervening in the family’s life
and, if that intervention results in the child being removed from the family, at the point when a decision must be made to reunify the family or
phere of happiness, love and understanding.”
17. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2 at 23–25.
18. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975). Mnookin provides many examples of
cases in which the court is clearly relying on personal values about race, sexual intimacy, middle class values, etc., Id. at 269–70.
19. Id. at 248, 265.
20. Id. at 267.
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create an alternative family for the child. When Mnookin is writing in
1976—two years after CAPTA required some form of representation for
children in child protective proceedings—he finds that states have failed to
define clearly the circumstances to justify initial intervention or to define
the appropriate bases for planning for the child once removed. Fearing the
power of the state to intervene in family autonomy for reasons more related to racial, cultural, or economic biases, Mnookin would limit child protection intervention to issues of physical health that can be clearly determined to present immediate or substantial risk to the child. Mnookin warns
that using the Goldstein et al. psychological parenting theory alone to
define BIOC in a more determinate way fails to answer fundamental policy questions about the state’s obligation to the family when the state
removes children from their parents’ care and has the power, ultimately, to
terminate parental rights and give the child to a new family.
One way to read Before the Best Interest of the Child, the second
volume of the trilogy published in 1979, is as an answer to Mnookin’s
concerns. Goldstein et al. offer guidelines for the provision of reunification services for separated families and a specific time frame for when the
state should stop attempting reunification and support the creation of
another family for a child.21 More fundamentally, Before is a powerful
portrayal of family and of the power of the state to destroy family.
Highlighting their beliefs about the psychological, historical, and philosophical underpinnings of the family, Before categorizes three overlapping elements of families with children: parental autonomy, children’s
right to have autonomous parents, and privacy. These elements form a
core of family integrity that cannot be breached by state authorities except
under two conditions. The first is when society, as a whole, has expectations for all children that individual families must obey, such as mandatory education, labor restrictions for minors, or vaccination policies. As the
symposium discussed, these types of protective policies for children,
became widely accepted in the United States and Western Europe in the
twentieth century. The second is when the state intervenes in the parenting decisions of individual families because they fail to meet basic health
and safety standards for children.22 This idea too has become widespread,
incorporated into Article 9 of the CRC:
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her
parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination
21. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., at 104–05.
22. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., at 93–94.
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may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of
the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a
decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence.

The CRC uses the overarching BIOC language in Article 9 to identify
when children may be separated from their parents, leaving to nation
states the responsibility to define its legal meaning. Goldstein et al., on the
other hand, prophetically warn of the difficulty in defining such an indeterminate standard as BIOC to intervene in families. Their fear of state
overreaching narrows their bases for intervention considerably. Like
Mnookin, Goldstein et al. would require a child’s physical health to be at
risk of impairment or impaired, whether through physical or sexual abuse
or by neglect, before the state can intervene to protect the child. Grounds
that rely on concepts of emotional neglect, actions of parents that can be
interpreted through cultural biases, and conditions that spring predominantly from poverty, do not fall within the state’s power to intervene
except through the provision of public benefits or voluntarily accepted
services.23 Nor does any notion of child autonomy within the family form
a basis for this intervention. Goldstein et al. would certainly reject the
Swedish model of making the family more egalitarian, and the child less
dependent on parental authority, especially if the state were then to take a
more affirmative role in supporting a child’s autonomy within the family.24 Rather, Goldstein et al. would keep the state at bay for all but the
clearest provable examples of child maltreatment. Nevertheless, once the
intervention occurs and a child’s placement is disturbed, Goldstein et al.
remain committed to the psychological theory developed in Beyond: the
child’s best interests are served by supporting whatever psychological
parent-child relationship ensues, including a new parental relationship if
the previous, usually biologically based, psychological parent-child relationship is irrevocably broken. Together Before and Beyond provide a
legal and psychological template—albeit a controversial one—for narrowing the indeterminacy of a best interests analysis.
And the conversation about BIOC continued. Five years after the publication of Before, a conference was held at Rutgers Law School to
address the impact of Beyond and Before on child welfare policy in the
United States. As the overview to the Rutgers conference confirms, in a
mere ten years, these two volumes changed the way in which law and policymakers thought about child placement decisions and termination of
23. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 111–13.
24. See, e.g., Bengt Sandin, From Differences to Likeness: The Organization of Welfare
and Conceptualization of Childhood in Sweden, Looking for Points of Comparison (paper presented to symposium on file with the author).
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parental rights. By invoking the psychological parent theory, statutes and
case decisions had incorporated Goldstein et al.’s recommendations,
including specific time frames for termination of parental rights and a
reliance on psychological parent theory for determining case outcomes.25
Conference participants voiced grave (and angry) concerns, some presciently foreseen earlier by Mnookin, that the theory was being applied
simplistically and parents who lacked any political power—particularly
poor parents of color—were losing their children in large numbers.26
While participants acknowledged that Goldstein et al.’s psychological
parent theory did not inevitably lead to termination of parental rights, they
overall feared and reported that result.27 Moreover, Goldstein et al.’s powerful argument to reject the vague concept of best interests as the driving
force for intervening in families was not being similarly embraced in practice. The child’s need for continuity and stability once removed from
parents was not being applied prior to removal from parents.28 Multiple
participants warned that decisions to disrupt intact families were being
driven by bias against poor, uneducated, culturally and racially different
communities.29 Both Solnit and Goldstein vehemently responded to these
concerns.30 Solnit reaffirmed their psychological parent theory as the basis
for not intervening in autonomous families initially as well as for not
disturbing new psychological bonds once formed. He did not retreat from
the centrality of their argument of the essential nature of this bond, even
as other participants questioned the underlying basis of the theory and the
25. Nadine Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s Proposals: An
Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 485, 488 (1983).
26. David Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating the Rights of Parents of Children in
Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 504 (1983); Solnit/Fanshel Discussion 12
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE at 521 (1983); Everett Waters & Donna Noyes, Psychological
Parenting vs. Attachment Theory: The Child’s Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right
Things for the Wrong Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 505, 512 (1983); Carol B.
Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. PROB. 539, 541
(1983); Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications of the Psychological
Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 549, 551; Peggy C. Davis, Use and Abuse
of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557 (1983).
27. Taub, supra note 25, at 492; The participants raised many other concerns not addressed
in this article, including the sufficiency of the underlying psychological evidence (Davis, supra
note 26, at 557; Waters & Noyes, supra note 26, at 505); the historical underpinnings of family integrity (Gordon at 523); and the variations on family construction (Davis, id.; Stack, supra
note 26, at 539).
28. Davis, supra note 26, at 562.
29. Fanshel, supra note 26, at 504; Davis, supra note 26, at 561; Stack, supra note 26, at 541.
30. Solnit participated in the conference, Albert Solnit, Psychological Dimensions in Child
Placement Conflicts, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 495 (1983); and Goldstein was interviewed following the conference, Interview with Joseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 575 (1983).
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lack of cultural context in its application.31 Goldstein responded more
holistically to the concerns, recognizing the actual impact the theory was
having on children entering foster care. He urged child welfare systems to
create effective measures to maintain contact between parents and children in order to support the biological relationship while the child is temporarily in care, to have foster parents raise children in ways that closely
mirror the habits of their biological parents, and to develop time frames
for decision making that balance the child’s needs with a recognition that
state systems work poorly to reach determinations.32 He reiterated that one
of the core purposes of their work is to diminish the indeterminacy of the
BIOC standard by providing guidelines for decision making to replace the
value laden, personal biases of the professionals involved with these families. Finally, he previewed the content of the third volume of the trilogy,
an attempt to define more clearly the roles of professionals making decisions about children’s placements.33
This third book, In the Best Interests of the Child, applies Goldstein et
al.’s proposed limitations on indeterminacy outlined in the first two books
to the way in which professionals actually intervene in families’ lives. The
warnings that issued from the Rutgers Conference reflected more than concern about the meaning and use of BIOC as a standard. They also addressed
the burgeoning business of child welfare proceedings and how professionals—judges, lawyers, social workers and psychologists, to name the most
obvious examples—used this standard in their actions on behalf of the families or family members they served. If Goldstein et al.’s theories were being
applied only to maintain relationships that children build after they have
been removed from their biological parent’s care, who was doing this, and
why? For the purposes of this examination, what were lawyers for children
doing? How did they understand and apply their role almost twenty years
after Gault? What did this third book have to say to them?
By the time In the Best Interests was written, children were receiving
some form of advocacy in child welfare proceedings across the country.34
The variation in roles for lawyers, GALs and lay advocates has been documented repeatedly as one of the bases for the failure to create a definitive role for a child advocate.35 Yet, even faced with ambiguous legal defi31. Davis, supra note 26; Stack, supra note 26.
32. GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., supra note 2.
33. While Before had concluded with a chapter on the role of the lawyer for a child, this discussion of role is better incorporated into an analysis of the third volume, IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD.
34. See Federle, supra note 5.
35. Id.; Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Child’s Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996).
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nitions of their role, advocates who are lawyers are governed by professional codes that limit their discretion from the outset.36 In recent years,
practice standards promulgated by preeminent legal and child advocacy
organizations have provided lawyers with far more guidance in understanding and implementing their role.37 And consensus has been growing
toward lawyers rejecting a role that does not presume child-directed representation, which significantly limits lawyer discretion when advocating
on behalf of their client.38 Nevertheless, BIOC continues to infuse the role
of a lawyer for a child. The symbolic power of being able to represent
what is best for a child, rather than to represent what is constrained by
client wishes and needs in the context of professional and legal boundaries
cannot be underestimated. Even strong proponents of child-directed advocacy rationalize BIOC as a component of the lawyer’s role.39
In the Best Interest of the Child helps the lawyer to recognize the reasons for this rationalization and provides guidance for resisting its lure.
The book purposefully distinguishes between substantive outcomes in
proceedings and procedural practices that are used by professionals to
reach those outcomes in order to highlight that right practices by professionals (even on behalf of positions that Goldstein et al. oppose) are
essential in proceedings that impact on children and families.40 These
right practices include four essential elements to limit both the indeterminacy of standards applied to child placement decisions and any unnecessary intervention in parent-child relationships: identifying personal
values, distinguishing personal and professional knowledge, recognizing
the impact of personal knowledge and values on professional decisionmaking, and acknowledging the limits of each type of professional role.41
36. See supra note 5.
37. American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing a Child in
Abuse and Neglect Cases, http://www.abanet.org/child/childrep.html; National Association of
Counsel for Children Standards, http://www.naccchildlaw.org/training/standards.html; New
York State Bar Association Law Guardian Representation Standards, http://www.nysba.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resources/NYSBA_Reports/Guide_to_Representing_
Children/Guide_to_Representing_Children.htm.
38. Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6
NEV. L.J. 592 (2006). Both sets of recommendations affirm client-directed representation for
child clients.
39. Jean Koh Peters, The Role and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1513 (1996).
40. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 158.
41. Id. at 157–61; GOLDSTEIN ET AL. are equally concerned that each professional keep
to his or her appropriate role, even as they come to understand the knowledge of the other
disciplines or roles.
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Long before child welfare professionals began to hear about concepts of
“cultural competence” in their practices, Goldstein et al. were warning
them not only to be aware of their personal biases but to understand that
those biases have a habit of substituting for professional knowledge when
peoples’ lives—especially children’s—are at the center of the controversy. For lawyers representing children, these right practices should limit
the lawyer’s almost overwhelming desire to decide what is best for the
client by providing clearer boundaries for decision making. An underlying element of these right practices is the presumption that, “Professional
persons know that the ultimate goal of the placement process is to provide
children with parents who will be free from further state intrusion: free to
use or refuse their help, free to accept or reject their interventions.”42
While this presumption is fully consistent with United States constitutional law—which limits the state intervention in family integrity—it is
more aspirational than actual.43 Limiting the impact of personal knowledge and values and distinguishing personal from professional knowledge
in order to constrain one’s professional role is extremely difficult for the
very reasons that Goldstein et al. identify:
Yet the tragic situations that they often confront in child placement cases tend
to blur professionals’ awareness of their own limitations and the limits of their
assignments. Their personal experiences and sympathies sometimes interfere
with their professional judgment. And their effort to maintain a purely professional stance carries with it the risk that they may become too distant and lose
the empathy that is essential to good work with children and their families.44

When In the Best Interests was written, Goldstein et al. rejected a
model of child advocacy that was substantially child-directed. Concerned
that lawyers have insufficient knowledge and experience to understand
the complexity of either their child-client’s stage of development or the
parent-child relationship in order to counsel the child effectively about the
representation, Goldstein et al. recommended instead that “the task of
counsel for children is to discover and to represent the interests of the
specific child who is their client,” while immediately acknowledging that
there is no consensus on what that really means.45 They knew, at a minimum, that providing a recommendation or taking a position based on personal values or knowledge beyond their professional expertise was not the
right role. And they urged child advocates to partner with experts in other
42. Id. at 154.
43. Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 331, 340 (2002).
44. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 154.
45. Id. at 171.
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fields in order to “discover” the child’s true interests. In essence, to learn
enough about child development, health, and behavior to know what questions are important to ask. This model of discovering the client’s interests
is most akin to the model of “substituting judgment” that has been adopted by client-directed lawyers for children who, after determining that their
client does not have the capacity to direct his or her representation, take
steps to determine what position the client would want taken if the client
had the capacity to direct the representation. But for a child-client capable
of directing representation on some or all of the issues being litigated,
substituting judgment or “discovering the child’s interests” risks looking
a lot like deciding what is best for the child. For that reason, I think now
Goldstein et al. would embrace the child-directed role for lawyers as the
only paradigm for which it is possible for the lawyer to engage in the right
practices they proscribe: distinguishing between personal values and professional knowledge; remaining true to their assigned role as counsel; and
resisting taking on the roles of other professionals in the case.
At the time Goldstein et al. were writing, the question of when a representative for a child should be appointed in child welfare proceedings was
not settled. Consistent with their belief in family autonomy, Goldstein et al.
believed children should not be represented by separate counsel until after
the court determined that they had been maltreated. At the point, that is,
when the court formally determined by law that their interests diverged. In
the succeeding decades that position did not prevail. Children are generally
represented (whether by an attorney or another type of advocate) from the
commencement of the court proceedings. As a result, from the very beginning of the case, lawyers are tempted to see their clients in opposition to
their parents. This temptation, combined with the concerns Goldstein et al.
identified about failing to use right practices, leads me to conclude that
today Goldstein et al. would agree that only a client-directed model of representation has the potential to limit the indeterminacy of BIOC by limiting
the freedom of the lawyer to decide what is “best.” The New York child
advocacy experience provides significant support for my belief.
Unlike in many states, New York law does not explicitly require
lawyers for children—called law guardians in New York—to represent
the client’s best interests. Yet the underlying substantive law, the case law
interpreting the law guardian’s role, and the difficulty lawyers have in
limiting the scope of their responsibilities all reinforce the totemic power
of BIOC to shape the lawyer’s role. New York statutory law broadly
defines the lawyer’s role:
This act declares that minors who are the subject of family court proceedings
or appeals in proceedings originating in the family court should be represented

406

Family Law Quarterly, Volume 41, Number 2, Summer 2007

by counsel of their own choosing or by law guardians. This declaration is based
on a finding that counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due
process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact
and proper orders of disposition. This part establishes a system of law guardians
for minors who often require the assistance of counsel to help protect their interests and to help them express their wishes to the court. Nothing in this act is
intended to preclude any other interested person from appearing by counsel.46

Lawyers are barely constrained by this definition. The statute simply
recognizes that a lawyer is the right professional to help “protect their
interests” and “express their wishes to the court.” Nowhere is the lawyer
being asked to assume a role that protects the child’s best interests. New
York has provided children with lawyers in child welfare proceedings for
nearly forty years through institutional organizations, assigned counsel
systems, and private practice. There is a tradition of regular training, local
as well as statewide standards of law guardian practice, and periodic
reporting on the role of the law guardian.47 The New York system has been
analyzed repeatedly in academic and practice articles that have consistently portrayed New York lawyers as being (at least theoretically) independent advocates on behalf of their clients.48 Neither the lack of statutory definitional constraint nor the tradition of independence, however, has resulted in the children’s bar fully embracing a system of representation that
reflects the right practices that Goldstein et al. outline in In the Best
Interests of the Child, which foster a noninterventionist family policy for
their clients or strive to limit the indeterminacy of a BIOC approach. This
is because lawyers do not work in a vacuum. The multiple factors that have
shaped law guardian practice in New York during the last forty years have,
in fact, either rejected or ignored the lessons of Goldstein et al. No factor
in that process may have had more influence than the way New York
courts interpreted the underlying substantive child welfare law. Goldstein
et al. believed that the state should intervene in families when the detriment
of not intervening was greater than the detriment of intervening. Fearful,
especially, that state foster care systems routinely fail children, Goldstein
et al. further recommended that state intervention take place only when
specific acts of harm could be established. Until recently, however, New
York courts routinely rejected this construction of child protective policies
for a more open-ended, indeterminate BIOC analysis despite statutory language to the contrary. This rejection had a fundamental impact on the role
46. New York Family Court Act § 241.
47. Jane M. Spinak, The Role of Strategic Management Planning in Improving the
Representation of Clients: A Child Advocacy Example, 34 FAM. L.Q. 497 (2000); Martin
Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805 (2006).
48. Spinak, supra note 47, at 503; Guggenheim, supra note 47, at 807.
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of lawyers for children and the child welfare decisions made by courts.
In October 2004, the New York Court of Appeals issued a landmark
decision in Nicholson v. Scopetta, clarifying the meaning of two definitions in child welfare law in New York: what places a child at “imminent
risk” for removal from parental care prior to any determination of maltreatment and what constitutes less than a “minimum degree of care” to
satisfy an allegation of neglect.49 For the first time since the current child
maltreatment statutes were enacted in 1969, the highest judicial authority
of the state interpreted the statutory definitions of these two terms. In
doing so, the court finally rejected what had come to be called the “safer
course” doctrine of removing a child from parents alleged to have neglected them as being less harmful to the child than leaving the child with
the parents until a factual determination of harm could be made (except in
clear emergency situations). Instead, pursuant to Nicholson, a family court
judge now must determine whether the trauma to the child of removal is
greater than the risk to the child’s health and safety of being allowed to
remain at home pending a determination of whether the parent has neglected the child. Only by balancing the harm of removal with the harm of
allowing the child to remain at home can the court satisfy the statutory
best interests requirement:
The court must do more than identify the existence of a risk of serious harm.
Rather, a court must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal.
It must balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and it must
determine factually which course is in the child’s best interests.

BIOC is given a definition and meaning that limits the court’s authority to intervene in the family without recognizing the impact of such intervention on the child’s well-being. When the family court then reaches the
stage of the proceeding that determines whether the child has been neglected, the state must prove actual harm to the child by the specific actions
or omissions of the parent or caretaker. The Nicholson court noted both
the historical concern of the legislature of unwarranted intervention in
family life when the statute was written and the need to guard against finding neglect based solely on undesirable parental conduct.50 Nicholson recognizes the deep bonds between parents and children and the looming
destructive power of state intervention that Goldstein et al. earlier identified as key elements in child-welfare placement policies. If Nicholson
had been decided twenty-five years ago, at about the time of Before’s pub49. Nicholson v. Scopetta, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2004).
50. Id. at 201.
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lication, law guardian practice would have been shaped by this far more
cautious approach to family intervention.51 Instead, it was shaped by the
repeated application of the “safer course” doctrine as substantive law.
Martin Guggenheim recently reflected on the impact of a more broadly
defined “safer course” doctrine on law guardian practice.52 While the
Nicholson decision addressed the legal standards that now must be applied
to reduce unnecessary intervention in families, Guggenheim exposes the
reasons why many law guardians embraced the pre-Nicholson interventionist approach. He believes lawyers for children are under enormous
pressure in child welfare proceedings to follow a “safer course,” that contains three elements: a presumption that a conflict between parent and child
exists; an assumption that a parent charged in a neglect or abuse proceeding is unfit; and a form of risk aversion that assumes separating a child
from a parent is more likely to keep the child safe.53 He traces this “safer
course” presumption to an appellate court ruling from the early 1980s. The
appellate court, In the Matter of Jennifer G., removed the child’s lawyer
before remanding the case back to the family court for rehearing. The
lawyer had taken the position during the earlier family court proceeding
that it was an appropriate “risk” to permit the child to return home.54 While
the choice of words may have been unfortunate, the lawyer was advocating for a position consistent with the substantive law of the state and with
his clients wishes and interests, as he was obliged to do. Guggenheim
believes that if the lawyer’s office—the most prominent legal office for
children in the state—had challenged the lawyer’s removal, the children’s
bar would have been fortified in rejecting the safer-course approach to their
advocacy, an approach that allows lawyers to advocate for what they think
is best for their clients. Lawyers for children would have been able to
incorporate into their advocacy what Goldstein et al. point out in Beyond
and Nicholson much later acknowledges: that all decisions concerning
children’s placements contain risk, but decisions circumscribed by the
most current professional knowledge are better decisions.
The impact of the decision in Jennifer G. on lawyers for children was
51. At a recent panel discussion held at Cardozo Law School concerning the role of lawyers
for children in New York child protective proceedings, Gary Solomon, one of the preeminent
lawyers and legal interpreters of the role of the law guardian in New York, stated that lawyers
had to be bound by the interpretation in Nicholson to see that these standards were met prior to
taking the position that their client should be removed from parental care.
52. Guggenheim, supra note 47.
53. Id. These three elements are, of course, in total contrast to Goldstein et al.’s requirement
that professionals be shaped by the boundaries of substantive law that limits intervention into
family life and presumes family autonomy prior to any finding of unfitness.
54. In re Jennifer G., 487 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (App. Div. 1985).

When Did Lawyers Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud and Solnit?

409

compounded by two personal values that Guggenheim believes suffuses
child advocacy: lawyers like to win and lawyers for children like to be
heroes. Prior to Nicholson, following the safer-course approach was more
likely to secure a winning result. And winning gave lawyers a sense that
they were protecting their clients:
In addition, children’s lawyers also get to perform a special role in our culture:
that of “hero.” Charged with a special duty to protect their “clients” from danger, children’s lawyers are rewarded professionally and emotionally when they
step forward and argue for intervention to prevent possible future harm. We
have not designed or conceived of the children’s bar as having been erected to
prevent state overreaching. Quite the opposite. The children’s bar exists to
ensure that all children who need state protection receive it. And sometimes the
children’s lawyer gets to be the protecting hero.55

Goldstein et al. foreshadowed Guggenheim’s hero role when they cautioned that child welfare professionals, ladened with a “multitude of personal beliefs and ordinary knowledge about what is good and bad for children and about what makes a satisfactory or unsatisfactory parent,” will
want to rescue children rather than, in the case of the lawyer, represent
them.56
One further aspect of New York appellate case law reinforces
Guggenheim’s theory. Even recent cases addressing the law guardian role
have split in their analysis of whether the law guardian should be representing the client’s wishes or best interests.57 While there has been a
greater acceptance of the law guardian’s independent advocacy role in the
last few years—especially rejecting the practice of law guardians providing the court with ex parte reports as if they were court advisors and not
advocates for a client—these same courts continue to use best interests
language to define the law guardian’s role, even though the word “best”
never appears in FCA § 241:
[The] law guardian has the statutorily directed responsibility to represent the
child’s wishes as well as to advocate the child’s best interest. Because the result
desired by the child and the result that is in the child’s best interest may
diverge, law guardians sometimes face a conflict in such advocacy.58

As the official commentary for the Family Court Act notes about this
case, “The [court], like most, uses the phrase “best interests” instead of the
55. Guggenheim, supra note 47, at 830.
56. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 160.
57. In the 2003 commentaries to FCA § 241, Merrill Sobie notes that four recent cases in
three appellate departments reach seemingly contradictory results about the law guardian role.
(Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, Family Ct. Act
§ 241.
58. Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (2000).
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statutory word “interests,” although the adjective “best” modifies the
word “interests,” arguably changing the meaning.”59 Arguably indeed.
Why do courts persist in misstating the law guardian’s responsibilities and
why do law guardians persist in letting them? Beyond succumbing to the
safer-course strategy and enjoying the hero role, lawyers cling to wanting
to do what’s “best” for the very reasons that Goldstein et al. wrote in In
the Best Interests:
We believe that [professionals] would agree that they ought not to exceed their
authority and ought not to go beyond or counter to their special knowledge or
training. But we do not take for granted that they always recognize when they
go or are asked to go beyond these limits. Sometimes they do not recognize that
they are doing what they “know” they ought not to do. This may be because the
law gives them vague and ambiguous assignments; because they have a strong
desire to help people in trouble; because they feel a need to justify their work;
because they desire to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging that they do
not know something; because they do not pause to consider whether they
are being asked to exceed their professional qualifications; or because of a combination of these and other less obvious (or perhaps, less understandable)
reasons.60

Knowing the limits of authority and training requires lawyers for
children to mistrust themselves. The fallibility of professionals of good
will that Goldstein et al. describe is the most important lesson that their
last book imparts for all child advocates. When they provide examples of
lawyers for children acting appropriately or inappropriately in their role,
they are harbingers for the standards of practice that have been developed,
especially during the last ten years, and the complementary analysis of the
lawyer’s role that has been generated. Goldstein et al. would be encouraged, I believe, with the care and seriousness that lawyers for children
have recently devoted to scrutinizing their role and to developing standards of practice that purposefully limit their discretion. Moreover, many
lawyers for children have embraced a multidisciplinary model of representation that draws on the expertise of their colleagues in social work and
psychology, especially to inform their representation with the expertise
they lack. That is why I believe Goldstein et al. would prefer—or at least
find “least detrimental”—a child-directed model of representation. For the
reasons I have described, child-directed advocacy is the only paradigm
that embraces Goldstein et al.’s right practices, allows lawyers to remain
true to their assigned role, and to resist taking on the roles of other professionals in the case. At the time they were writing, Goldstein et al. also
59. Sobie, supra note 57, referring to the decision in Carballeira v. Shumway.
60. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 155; emphasis in original.
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believed that a function of the family court was to advise lawyers about
the parameters of their role by invoking the statutory limits of child placement regimes.61 What we have learned from the Nicholson and Jennifer
G. examples, however, is that courts cannot be relied on to provide those
limits. Lawyers must establish those limits themselves. The current childdirected model is far more nuanced and limited than the “child wishes”
representation they rejected in their books. These client-directed models
draw on the rich experience of the past twenty-five years to train lawyers
with multidisciplinary knowledge about children and families; to draw on
lawyer’s ethical codes to understand the limits of their role; to develop
methods of representation that are child-centered and child-friendly in
order to maximize the child’s understanding of the lawyer’s role and the
proceedings; to learn and appreciate alternative forms of dispute resolution that may diminish the impact of state intervention in the family’s life;
and to be bound by the substantive law that recognizes the centrality of
family integrity. Goldstein et al. called on legislators and courts to ask
continuously: “Does the law reflect the current state of knowledge,” to
minimize the harm when the state intervenes in the lives of families? I
believe they would recognize today that the current state of knowledge
about lawyers for children indicates that only child-directed representation is most likely to achieve that result.
Most nations have failed to nurture and support children so they can
grow to be the happy, healthy and productive adults, which was the hope
of the Century of the Child. That is, they have failed to follow the overarching principle of securing the child’s best interests that the Convention
establishes as a primary consideration for all nations. This is certainly a
profound defeat for any movement of children’s rights. Within the profession of child advocacy in the United States, there is an additional and
paradoxical failure to understand the limits of a BIOC standard as an
organizing principle for representing children’s rights. Rather, when we
look back at forty years of child advocacy in child welfare proceedings,
we can see how the indeterminate BIOC standard helped to enable
lawyers to fashion a system of representation that substituted the lawyer’s
understanding of what is best for a rigorous client-centered exploration of
the child’s interests within strict legal boundaries. Goldstein et al. identified the perils of indeterminacy and provided a template for resisting
their allure. The time has come for lawyers to reread their books and
revive their lessons in the service of twenty-first century client-centered
child advocacy.
61. Id. at 144.

